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Abstract 
Owing to the advances in technology, new types of service delivery spring up in the sharing economy. 
Owning no warehouse and hiring no full-time shippers, Instacart runs its grocery delivery service by 
delivering grocery from independent retailers by independent contractors to its consumers. This 
“platform delivery” model is formulated as a game-theoretic model and investigated. We discuss the 
profitability of three common pricing strategies, membership-based pricing, transaction-based pricing, 
and cross subsidization. It is shown that these three strategies generate the same amount of profit for 
the perfectly patient platform. However, in general the membership-based strategy would be better than 
the others. 
Keywords: Sharing economy, Network externality, Delivery service competition, Game theory 
 
 
 
  
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Owing to the advances in technology, different types of delivery services spring up in recent years. In 
the grocery delivery industry, AmazonFresh adopts integrated delivery and delivers grocery from self-
owned warehouse to its consumers. On the contrary, Instacart owns no warehouse and runs its service 
by delivering grocery from independent retailers to its consumers. Moreover, instead of hiring full-time 
employees, Instacart relies on independent contractors to provide the deliveries. 1 As this type of service 
shares the same multi-sided platform idea with Uber and Airbnb, we call it platform delivery.  
In general, the success of an Internet-based platform relies on its installed base, and the benefit of using 
a service provided by a platform increases as the number of its user raises up. This is known as positive 
network externality. With network externality, a platform could not only make its service more valuable 
but also leverage this effect to enter a new market. One common approach of entering a new market is 
to subsidize users at the beginning. Take Uber for example, it gave new users 200 TWD when it 
expanded its business to Taipei in mid-2013, and the numbers of drivers and passengers had increased 
by an average of 30 percent a month up to the end of march 2015.2 Similarly, Instacart offers a free first 
delivery to attract as many consumers as possible, in the hope that the initial users will attract more 
consumers in a virtuous cycle. 
There might be some perceptible problems resulting from the self-scheduling characteristic of Instacart. 
One of them is a shortage of resources (contractors). Because the contractors are actually not employed 
by Instacart, every contractor could decide when to work. Thus, if most of the contractors decide not to 
work at the same time, or a sudden demand for grocery delivery takes place, the shortage of the resources 
will occur. Moreover, the part-time contractor lacked of experience may deliver the wrong groceries to 
the consumers or deliver them in a bad condition. On the other hand, AmazonFresh's full-time 
employees empower AmazonFresh to provide a stable and reliable service. AmazonFresh might have 
the ability to prevent it from the shortage problem to a certain degree. In short, while Instacart may save 
money from owning no warehouse and full-time employees, it faces the challenge of attracting enough 
contractors to provide good enough services to attract customers. Its pricing strategy is therefore critical 
for running a financially sustainable business.  
While in theory there can be all kinds of pricing mechanisms, in practice three kinds of strategies are 
common. If a company adopts the membership-based pricing strategy, the platform sustains losses in 
every transaction but charges every consumer a fixed membership fee at the beginning. On the opposite, 
the platform may charge a per transaction fee but no fixed fee. This is the transaction-based pricing 
strategy. In either case, the platform needs to pay the shipper a per transaction fee. This introduces the 
third strategy, the cross-subsidization strategy, under which the platform simply subsidizes the shipper 
exactly the amount collected from the customer in each transaction. It is worthwhile to investigate which 
pricing strategy may generate the highest profit for the platform.  
In this study, we construct a game-theoretic model featuring network externality and sharing economy 
to address our research questions. There are three types of players in the market, a firm providing 
platform delivery service, a group of potential consumers, and a group of potential shippers. The major 
purpose of our work is to study the profitability of the three pricing strategies and figure out factors that 
affect the firm's choice. Our main finding is somewhat surprising: All the three strategies result in the 
same amount of customers, shippers, and profits. Considering that charging a membership fee allows 
the firm to collect money earlier than charging transaction fees, our results may partly justify the current 
membership-based pricing strategy adopted by Instacart.  
In the next section, we review some related works with respect to sharing economy, network externality 
and delivery service competition. In Section 3, we develop a game-theoretic model that addresses the 
                                              
1 For more details about Instacart’s model, please refer to, e.g., http://nextjuggernaut.com/blog/how-instacart-works-makes-
money-revenue-business-model. 
2 Information source: http://topics.amcham.com.tw/2015/03/uber-taiwan-transportation-or-information-company/. 
  
interaction among the firm, customers, and shippers. Analysis and results are then presented in Section 
4. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the transportation industry, many companies want to copy Uber’s business model or at least find out 
the critical success factors making Uber become a classic paradigm shift. Specifically, quite a few people 
attribute the success of Uber to “sharing economy,” which emphasizes how to make good use of idle 
resources spreading in the market. For instance, Santi et al. (2014) claim that the cumulative trip length 
could be reduced by roughly 40 percent when using ride sharing like Uber related to traditional taxis. 
Andersson et al. (2013) investigate ways ride sharing could improve the use of idle resources, and 
classify the business model of sharing economy into three kinds according to the properties of trade 
matching. Zervas et al. (2015) analyze the competition relationship between Airbnb and hotel chains. 
They conclude that Airbnb can expand their service coverage rapidly due to the little marginal cost and 
pose a threat to the traditional hotel chains. In general, it is argued that sharing economy has benefits 
including near-zero marginal cost from digitalization, high quality of trade matching through the Internet, 
and utilization of available resources (Felländer et al., 2015).  
In the delivery industry, sharing economy has also called the attentions from researchers. Both Teresa 
and Christy (2015) and Rougés and Montreuil (2004) study the paradigm change of platform delivery 
(called crowdsourcing delivery in their studies). They claim that platform delivery can eliminate the 
requirements of inventory management and is thus advantageous. While platform delivery seems to 
have more advantages over integrated delivery, it also has its drawbacks. In particular, Gurvich et al. 
(2015) argue that using a self-scheduling mechanism to let independent contractors provide services to 
customers can actually impose excess costs on a firm and hurt the service quality. The limit of platform 
delivery deserves our further study.  
In the economics literature, several past studies examine two-sided platforms. As a pioneering work, 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) start the analysis of network externality. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) study 
the competition between a monopolistic incumbent and a potential entrant in a two-sided market. They 
explicitly and develop an incumbent's pricing strategy to deter the threat of entrant. Armstrong (2006) 
develop an optimal pricing function similar to the Lerner index to depict how the price elasticity of 
demand and network externality jointly affect the platform's pricing strategy. Rochet and Tirole (2006) 
study a two-sided platform’s pricing problem with pure membership prices and pure usage charges. Jing 
(2007) delves into how network externality impacts on the product line design. We contribute to this 
stream of literature by studying how a platform delivery company may set up a two-sided pricing plan 
for profit maximization.  
3 MODEL 
We consider a market with two groups of people, consumers (for each of them, she) and shippers (for 
each of them, he), and a monopolistic platform (it) who provides platform delivery services to match 
consumers and shippers. To join the platform, a consumer pays a membership fee 𝐹𝐶 to the platform. 
She may then order on the platform and let the platform find a shipper for her. After matching a 
transaction successfully, a shipper is in duty bound to deliver groceries to a consumer. In every match, 
the platform charges a per transaction fee 𝑟C from the consumer and gives the shipper a per matching 
subsidy 𝑟S. The per matching cost incurred by the platform is 𝑐.  
Because shippers are independent contractors and are not forced to work for the platform, the number 
of shippers cannot be controlled by the platform. Therefore, the service quality depends on the number 
of shippers on the market in equilibrium. Let 𝑄 be the service quality and 𝑛𝑆 be the number of shippers 
on the market, in this study we assume that 𝑄 = √𝑛𝑆. This setting captures the fact that the quality 
  
increases as the number of shippers becomes more, and the marginal improvement is decreasing.3 
Consumers are heterogeneous on their type 𝜃, the willingness to pay for high-quality services. We 
assumed that 𝜃 is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Let 𝑁 > 0 be the number of orders that a consumer 
will order in one membership period, a type-𝜃 consumer’s utility is thus  
 𝑢C = 𝑁(𝜃𝑄 − 𝑟C) − 𝐹C. (1) 
To complete a transaction, the shipper incurs a per transaction cost 𝜂 from the platform. Therefore, his 
net earning for completing one transaction is −𝜂 + 𝑟𝑆. If there are 𝑛𝐶 customers being members of the 
platform, there will be in total 𝑁𝑛𝐶 orders in a membership period. Given that there are 𝑛𝑆 shippers in 
the market, each shipper in expectation will get 
𝑁𝑛𝐶
𝑛𝑆
 orders. Therefore, a type-𝜂 shipper’s utility in a 
membership period is  
 𝑢S =
𝑁𝑛C
𝑛S
(−𝜂 + 𝑟S). (2) 
It is assumed that a consumer or shipper will join the platform if 𝑢𝐶 ≥ 0 or 𝑢𝑆 ≥ 0, respectively. 
According to our setting, there exists a critical value 𝜃∗ which divides consumers into two groups: A 
consumer would join the platform if and only if 𝜃 > 𝜃∗. Similarly, there exists a critical value 𝜂∗ such 
that a shipper would join the platform if and only if 𝜂 < 𝜂∗. In our notation, this means  
 𝑛C = 1 − 𝜃
∗, 𝑛S = 𝜂
∗. (3) 
A visualization is provided in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. When will the consumers and shippers join the platform. 
The platform's problem is to maximize its profit 
 𝜋 = 𝑁𝑎𝑛C(𝑟C − 𝑟S − 𝑐) + 𝑛C𝐹C. (4) 
where 𝑎 ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor. When 𝑎 is small, the platform would like to collect money as 
soon as possible. In other words, the platform is more impatient. 
If a platform wants to maximize its profit, it should solve an optimization problem with three decision 
variables (𝐹𝐶, 𝑟C, and 𝑟S). As this is too complicated, many companies in practice adopt more 
restricted pricing strategies. In this study, we investigate the profitability of three pricing strategies 
commonly adopted in practice. By adopting the membership-based pricing strategy, the platform only 
charges consumers a fixed membership fee, i.e., 𝑟C = 0. On the opposite, under the transaction-based 
pricing strategy, the platform does not charge any fixed membership fee, i.e., 𝐹C = 0, and rely on 
transaction fees to generate revenue. The third strategy, cross-subsidization, lets the platform subsidize 
the shipper by the transaction fee collected from the consumer, i.e., 𝑟C = 𝑟S. We are interested in 
understanding the profitability of these three pricing strategies.  
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the platform decides the per transaction fee 𝑟C, the per 
matching subsidy 𝑟S, and the membership fees 𝐹C. Second, potential consumers and shippers observe 
the prices of using the service and decide whether to join the platform or not independently. In the end 
                                              
3 Note that this setting does not consider the negative externality among users (due to, e.g., competition for getting services). 
In Uber's case, such a component is required because as more customers using Uber to find a driver, the chances of getting the 
driving service becomes lower. For grocery delivery, however, this issue is not critical, as the grocery delivery service is 
typically not so urgently needed. We thus assume that 𝑄 is not affected by the number of customers in this study. In fact, this 
setting is also adopted by Armstrong (2006) to emphasize the impact of network externality on platform’s optimal strategy. 
  
of this stage, the sizes of the two groups would be realized, and the platform can calculate its optimal 
profit in equilibrium.  
4 ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the maximization problems of the platform delivery company. We present 
the platform company’s optimal profits respectively under three pricing strategies. We then reveal some 
characteristics of these strategies by comparing them. Finally, we compare their profitability. 
Throughout this section, we normalize the platform per matching cost 𝑐 to 0.  
We first develop the general profit function of platform. Combining (1), (2), (3), and 𝑄 = √𝑛S, we 
obtain the following equations: 
 𝐹C = 𝑁(𝜃
∗√𝜂∗ − 𝑟C), 𝐹S = 𝑁 (
1−𝜃∗
𝜂∗
) (−𝜂∗ + 𝑟S) = 0. (5) 
By solving the system, we get a unique solution of 𝜃∗ and 𝜂∗: 
 
𝜃∗ =
√𝑟S(𝑟C𝑁+𝐹C)
𝑟S𝑁
, 𝜂∗ = 𝑟S. (6) 
Substituting 𝜃∗ and 𝜂∗ into equation (4), we have the general platform’s profit function: 
 
𝜋 = (1 −
√𝑟S(𝑟C𝑁+𝐹C)
𝑟S𝑁
) (𝐹C + 𝑁(𝑎𝑟C − 𝑎𝑟S)). (7) 
4.1 Optimal profits 
When the platform adopts membership-based pricing strategy, it earns profits only from membership 
fee, i.e., 𝑟C = 0. Now, (7) can be rewritten as 
 
𝜋 
M = (1 −
√𝑟S𝐹C
𝑟S𝑁
) (𝐹C + 𝑁(−𝑎𝑟S)). (8) 
Then, the optimal solution can be found in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1. The optimal solution of membership-based pricing strategy: 
 𝑟S
M =
𝑎2+1
18
 and (9) 
 
𝐹C
M =
(√1+𝑎2(𝑎+𝑎2) +3√2(1+𝑎2))𝑁
36√1+𝑎2
. (10) 
Both 𝑟S
𝑀 and 𝐹C
M are non-negative. 
When the platform employs transaction-based pricing strategy, it earns profits only from per-transaction 
fee, i.e., 𝐹C = 0. Now, (7) can be rewritten as 
 
𝜋 
T = (1 −
√𝑟S𝑟C
𝑟S
) 𝑁(𝑎𝑟C − 𝑎𝑟S). (11) 
Then, the optimal solution can be found in Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. The optimal solution of transaction-based pricing strategy: 
 𝑟S
T =
1
9
 and (12) 
 𝑟C
T =
2
9
. (13) 
Both 𝑟S
T and 𝑟C
T are non-negative. 
  
When the platform adopts cross-subsidization strategy, it subsidizes a shipper by a transaction fee 
charged from a consumer in every matching, i.e., 𝑟C = 𝑟S. Now, (7) can be rewritten as 
 
𝜋 
X = (1 −
√𝑟S(𝑟S𝑁+𝐹C)
𝑟S𝑁
) 𝐹C. (14) 
Then, the optimal solution can be found in Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3. The optimal solution of cross-subsidization strategy: 
 𝑟S
X =
1
9
, (15) 
 𝑟C
X =
1
9
 and (16) 
 𝐹C
X =
1
9
𝑁. (17) 
All of 𝑟S
X, 𝑟C
X, and 𝐹C
T are non-negative. 
4.2 Comparisons 
Up until this point, we have the profit-maximizing prices of three possible pricing strategies. We would 
like to do some comparison on these strategies to see which one is the platform’s best pricing strategy. 
Furthermore, we hope our findings could help decision makers choose the business model of sharing 
economy. 
First of all, we compare each kind of fees respectively in three pricing strategies. The results are shown 
in proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. When 𝑎 = 1, we have 
 𝑟S
X = 𝑟S
T = 𝑟S
M
𝑟C
T > 𝑟C
X > 0
𝐹C
M > 𝐹C
X > 0
. (18) 
Otherwise, we have 
 𝑟S
T = 𝑟S
X > 𝑟S
M
𝑟C
T > 𝑟C
X > 0
𝐹C
M > 𝐹C
X > 0
. (19) 
Proposition 1 demonstrates some interesting findings. First, no matter what pricing strategy the platform 
employs when the platform is not impatient at all (𝑎 = 1), subsidies which the platform subsidizes to 
every shipper (𝑟S
 ) are all the same. This finding also means that the platform would make the number 
of shippers of its service in the same level. However, in general (𝑎 < 1) the platform would subsidize 
shippers the least under the membership-based one and the same under the others. Regarding the 
membership fee 𝐹C
 , unsurprisingly the platform adopting membership-based pricing strategy would 
charge membership fee on consumers more than the other strategies. Interestingly, the platform 
implementing the transaction-based pricing strategy would always charge the per-transaction fee from 
consumers more than the other strategies. 
If we only investigate the relative size of every kind of fees, it is still insufficient to see which strategy 
is the best for platform. Thus, we further discuss the platform’s profit-maximizing strategy (among the 
three strategies considered in this study) in proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. Platform’s optimal profits under three strategies are all the same when a = 1, i.e.,  
 𝜋 
M = 𝜋 
T = 𝜋 
X. (19) 
However, in general (𝑎 < 1) platform’s optimal profits under three strategies satisfy 
  
 𝜋 
M > 𝜋 
X > 𝜋 
T. (19) 
Figure 2 provides a visualization for proposition 2. 
 
Figure 2. Platform optimal profits under three strategies. 
Proposition 2 is an astonishing discovery. It shows that the three pricing strategies we discuss in this 
study are all the same for the platform to maximize profit when the platform is perfectly patient (𝑎 = 1).  
In fact, it can be analytically verified that 1 − 𝜃∗ and 𝜂∗, the numbers of participating consumers and 
shippers, are all the same. This means that the three pricing strategies are equivalent. However, as long 
as the platform is somewhat impatient ( 𝑎 < 1 ), membership-based pricing outperforms cross 
subsidization, which outperforms transaction-based pricing. Given that the three policies are equally 
good when three is no time discounting, it is intuitive that collecting money as early as possible is 
profitable if there is time discounting. This explains why membership-based pricing is the best and 
transaction-based pricing is the worst. Cross subsidization then lies in between. Our result may partly 
explain why Instacart tries hard to promote Instacart Express, its membership program.4  
The previous discussions are based on an exogenous 𝑁, the consumers’ number of orders. However, we 
can also investigate the case that the more the platform charges consumers, the less frequent the 
consumers use the platform’s services, i.e., 𝑁 is decreasing in 𝑟C
 . Owing to the platform’s profit would 
not be influenced by 𝑟C
  under the membership-based strategy, we can immediately speculate that this 
strategy would still be the best. However, the platform’s profit would be lower when 𝑟C
  increases under 
the other two strategies. In short, the results we get above are robust even if we make 𝑁 be a decreasing 
function of 𝑟C
 .  
Up until this point, we still wonder if there is a pricing strategy which is better than the pricing strategies 
we mention above. Thus, we have proposition 3. 
Proposition 3. When we set 𝑎 = 1 and 𝑐 = 0, the platform’s optimal solution would be 
 𝑟S
 =
1
9
  and  𝑟C
 𝑁 + 𝐹C =
2
9
𝑁. (20) 
Proposition 3 illustrates that the pricing strategies in proposition 2 are all indeed the best for a perfectly 
patient platform to employ.  
In addition to the above results, we have also consider two extensions: (1) take the platform’s marginal 
transaction cost into account; (2) subsidize shipper with a fixed subsidy rather than per-transaction one. 
The additional results are not far from the contents here: these three pricing policies are still all best for 
a perfectly patient platform, and subsidizing shipper with per-transaction subsidy is better than fixed 
                                              
4 By giving members unlimited free 2-hour and scheduled deliveries over $35, Instacart can collect $149 per year as the 
membership fee at the beginning of a membership cycle. Information source: https://news.instacart.com/2015/12/29/weve-
updated-our-delivery-prices/. 
  
one. Due to the page limit, these results are not shown here. Interested readers may contact us to request 
the complete manuscript.  
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we present a game-theoretic model featuring network externality and sharing economy to 
investigate three pricing strategies in platform delivery, i.e., membership-based pricing, transaction-
based pricing, and cross subsidization. We analytically calculate the optimal fees the platform should 
charge consumers under these three strategies and then investigate the relative magnitude among fees 
charged with every strategy. It is found that all the three strategies are equivalent to a perfectly patient 
platform: They result in the same per-transaction subsidy for shippers, numbers of shippers and 
consumers, and profits in equilibrium. However, as the platform’s degree of impatient increases, 
adopting membership-based strategy would be more and more profitable than the others according to 
our results. We further wonder if there is a pricing strategy which is better than the three pricing 
strategies, and find that they are all indeed the best for a perfectly patient platform to employ.  
Our study certainly has its limitations. First, if we take the platform’s marginal cost into account, a truly 
profit-maximizing pricing strategy for an impatient platform has not been found. It is worthwhile to 
characterize the optimal strategy to see if the three strategies we study are optimal or not. If they are not, 
the profit gap should be analyzed. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare this delivery model with 
the traditional approach, i.e., shipping from one's own warehouse by one's own full-time shippers like 
AmazonFresh. Conditions under which platform delivery is a better model call for further investigation.  
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
First of all, we let 𝑟P be an opposite number of 𝑟S, i.e., 𝑟S = −𝑟P. Formula (8) is equal to 
 𝜋 
M = (1 + √
−𝑟P𝐹C
𝑟P𝑁
) (𝐹C + 𝑁(𝑎𝑟P)). 
(A1) 
The derivatives of formula (A1) with respect to 𝐹C and 𝑟P can easily be deduced as 
∂𝜋 
M
∂𝐹C
= √
−𝑟P(𝑁(𝑎𝑟P)+2𝐹C)
𝑟P𝑁
+ 1 and 
∂𝜋 
M
∂𝑟P
=
2√−𝑟P𝑟P𝑁
2+(−𝑎𝑟P)𝐹C𝑁+𝐹C
2 
2√−𝑟P𝑟P𝑁
. The optimal solution 𝐹C
M and 𝑟P
M can 
be found when 
∂𝜋 
M
∂𝐹C
= 0 and 
∂𝜋 
M
∂𝑟P
= 0 are satisfied. 
∂𝜋 
M
∂𝐹C
= 0 implies 
 𝐹C = −
((𝑎√−𝑟P+1)𝑟P)𝑁
2√−𝑟P
. 
(A2) 
∂𝜋 
M
∂𝑟P
= 0 implies 
 
𝐹C =
(𝑎𝑟P)𝑁±√𝑎2𝑟P
2−8𝑎√−𝑟P𝑟P𝑁
2
. 
(A3) 
Let 𝑥 = √−𝑟P, we can rewritten (A2) and (A3) as 
 
𝐹C = −
((𝑎𝑥+1)(−𝑥2))𝑁
2𝑥
 and 
(A4) 
 
𝐹C =
(−𝑎𝑥2)𝑁±√𝑎2𝑥4+8𝑎𝑥3𝑁
2
. 
(A5) 
  
Solve the system (A4) and (A5), we can get four possible solutions. 𝑥 =
1±1
6𝑎
 or 
1±1
2𝑎
 . With 𝑟P = −𝑥
2, 
we can further get 𝑟P =
−𝑎2±1
18
. It can easily be verified that 𝑟P =
−𝑎2−1
18
 would always be optimal. Finally, 
we have optimal solution 
 𝑟S
M =
𝑎2+1
18
 and (A6) 
 
𝐹C
M =
(√1+𝑎2(𝑎+𝑎3) +3√2(1+𝑎2))𝑁
36√1+𝑎2
. 
(A7) 
 
Proof of Lemma 2 
First of all, we let 𝑟P be an opposite number of 𝑟S, i.e., 𝑟S = −𝑟P. Furthermore, we let 𝑟P = 𝑟P
′ − 𝑟C′ and 
𝑟C = 𝑟C′. Formula (11) is equal to 
 
𝜋 
T = (1 −
√𝑟C′−𝑟P′𝑟C
′
𝑟C
′ −𝑟P
′ ) 𝑁𝑎𝑟P′. 
(A8) 
The derivatives of formula (A8) with respect to 𝑟C
′  and 𝑟P′ can easily be deduced as 
∂𝜋 
T
∂𝑟C′
= 𝑎𝑟P
′ (
𝑟C
′
2(𝑟C
′ −𝑟P
′ )
3
2
−
1
√𝑟C′−𝑟P′
) 𝑁 and 
∂𝜋 
T
∂𝑟P′
=
(2𝑎(𝑟C
′ −𝑟P
′ )
3
2−2𝑎𝑟C
′ 2+𝑎𝑟P
′ 𝑟C
′ )𝑁
2(𝑟C
′ −𝑟P
′ )
3
2
. The optimal solution 𝑟C
′  and 
𝑟P
′  can be found when 
∂𝜋 
T
∂𝑟C′
= 0 and 
∂𝜋 
T
∂𝑟P′
= 0 are satisfied. 
∂𝜋 
T
∂𝑟C′
= 0 implies 
 𝑟C
′ = 2𝑟P
′ . (A9) 
∂𝜋 
T
∂𝑟P′
= 0 implies 
 𝑟P
′ =
1
9
. (A10) 
With 𝑟S = 𝑟C
′ − 𝑟P
′  and 𝑟C = 𝑟C′, we have optimal solution 
 𝑟S
T =
1
9
 and (A11) 
 𝑟C
T =
2
9
. (A12) 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
The derivatives of formula (14) with respect to 𝐹C and 𝑟S can easily be deduced as 
∂𝜋 
X
∂𝐹C
=
−𝑁𝑟S−2𝐹C
√𝑟S𝑁
+ 1 and 
∂𝜋 
X
∂𝑟S
= 𝐹C(
𝑟S𝑁+𝐹C
2𝑟S
3
2𝑁
−
1
√𝑟S
). The optimal solution 𝐹C
X and 𝑟S
X can be found when 
∂𝜋 
X
∂𝐹C
= 0 and 
∂𝜋 
X
∂𝑟S
= 0 are satisfied. 
∂𝜋 
X
∂𝐹C
= 0 implies 
 
𝐹C =
−𝑟S−√𝑟S
2
𝑁. 
(A13) 
∂𝜋 
X
∂𝑟S
= 0 implies 
 𝐹C = 0 or (A14) 
 𝑟S =
𝐹C
𝑁
. (A15) 
Solve system (A13) and (A14), we can get following solution 
  
 
{
𝑟S =
1±1
2
𝐹C = 0
. 
(A16) 
Solve system (A13) and (A15), we can get following solution 
 
{
𝑟S =
1±1
18
𝐹C =
1±1
18
𝑁
. 
(A17) 
It can easily be verified that 𝑟𝑆 =
1
9
 would always be optimal. Finally, we have optimal solution 
 𝑟S
X =
1
9
 and (A18) 
 𝐹C
X =
1
9
𝑁. (A19) 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
When 𝑎 = 1. To begin with, we can easily prove 𝑟S
M = 𝑟S
X = 𝑟S
T in that formulas (9), (12) and (15) are 
all equivalent. Furthermore, we can find the relation 𝑟C
T = 2𝑟C
X from formulas (13) and (16), which 
yields 𝑟C
M < 𝑟C
X < 𝑟C
T. Finally, we have 𝐹C
M =
2
9
𝑁 and 𝐹C
M = 2𝐹C
X which means, which means 𝐹C
M >
𝐹C
X > 𝐹C
T is true. 
When 𝑎 < 1. It can be verified that 𝑟S
T = 𝑟S
X > 𝑟S
M from formulas (9), (12) and (15). It can also be 
verified that 𝑟C
T > 𝑟C
X > 0  from formulas (13) and (16). Then, we have 𝐹C
M =
(√1+𝑎2(𝑎+𝑎2) +3√2(1+𝑎2))𝑁
36√1+𝑎2
=
(1+𝑎2)𝑎+3√2(1+𝑎2)
36
𝑁  and 𝐹C
X =
1
9
𝑁 =
4
36
𝑁 . Since (1 + 𝑎2)𝑎 +
3√2(1 + 𝑎2) is strictly increasing in 𝑎 and 𝑎 > 0, which means 𝑎 = 0 would minimize 𝐹C
M. If we put 
𝑎 = 0 into 𝐹C
M, we can get 𝐹C
M =
3√2
36
𝑁. Here, we notice that the minimum 𝐹C
M is larger than 𝐹C
X, which 
means 𝐹C
M > 𝐹C
X > 0 is true. Furthermore, it can be easily verified that both 𝜂∗ and 𝜃∗ all in 0 and 1.
                 
Proof of Proposition 2 
When we put 𝑎 = 1 and optimal solutions of three pricing strategies into formula (7), it can be calculated 
that platform’s profits under these three strategies would all be 
𝑁
27
. Furthermore, in general (𝑎 < 1) it 
can be analytically proved that 𝜋 
M > 𝜋 
X > 𝜋 
T as following. We first calculate the platform’s optimal 
profits in respect of three pricing strategies: With lemma 1, we have 𝜋 
M = (1 −
√18(√1+𝑎2𝑎+3√2)
36
) (
−𝑎3−𝑎+3√2(1+𝑎2)
36
) 𝑁 =
√2(𝑎2+1)(𝑎4+𝑎2+18)−12𝑎3−12𝑎
432
𝑁 ; With lemma 2, we have 
𝜋 
T =
1
27
𝑁𝑎; With lemma 3, we have 𝜋 
X =
1
27
𝑁. After that, it can be shown that 𝜋 
X > 𝜋 
T when 0 <
𝑎 < 1 : First of all, we have already known that 𝜋 
M = 𝜋 
X  when 𝑎 = 1  in the beginning of this 
proposition; Next, if 𝜋 
M is strictly decreasing in 𝑎 when 0 < 𝑎 < 1, then this prof is done. In next 
paragraph, we show that 𝜋 
M is strictly decreasing in 𝑎 when 0 < 𝑎 < 1. 
Let 𝑔(𝑎) represent the numerator of 𝜋 
M, i.e., 𝑔(𝑎) = √2(𝑎2 + 1)(a4 + a2 + 18) − 12a3 − 12𝑎. Then 
we can get 
𝜕𝑔(𝑎)
𝜕𝑎
=
√2𝑎(𝑎4+𝑎2+18)
√𝑎2+1
+ √2(a2 + 1)(4𝑎3 + 2𝑎) − 36𝑎2 − 12 =
√2𝑎(5𝑎4+7𝑎2+20)
√𝑎2+1
−
12(3𝑎2 + 1). 
𝜕𝑔(𝑎)
𝜕𝑎
= 0 implies 2𝑎2(5𝑎4 + 7𝑎2 + 20)2 = (𝑎2 + 1)144(3a2 + 1)2. Solve the above 
equation, we can get two real roots 𝑎 = ±√
√73−1
2
 and the other eight complex roots. Put the real roots 
  
into 𝑔′(𝑎), we have 𝑔′ (√
√73−1
2
) = 0 and 𝑔′ (−√
√73−1
2
) ≈ 1.94, we can claim that 𝜋 
M is decreasing 
in 𝑎 when 0 < 𝑎 < 1.               
Proof of Proposition 3 
First of all, we set 𝑟C
 𝑁 + 𝐹C
 = 𝑦 and 𝑎 = 1 then equation (7) could be rewritten as 𝜋 = (1 −
𝑦
√𝑟S
)(𝑦 −
𝑟S𝑁). Thus, the maximization problem now is 
 max
𝑟S,𝑦
(1 −
𝑦
√𝑟S𝑁
)(𝑦 − 𝑟S𝑁) 
 
 s.t. 0 ≤
𝑦
√𝑟S𝑁
≤ 1.  
        0 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ √𝑟S𝑁  
The derivatives of 𝜋  with respect to 𝑦  and 𝑟S  can be deduced as  
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑦
= −
2𝑦−𝑟S𝑁
√𝑟S𝑁
+ 1  and 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑟S
=
𝑦(𝑦−𝑟S𝑁)
2𝑟S
3
2𝑁
− (1 −
𝑦
√𝑟S𝑁
)𝑁. 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑦
= 0 implies 𝑦 =
𝑟S+√𝑟S
2
𝑁. 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑟S
= 0 implies 𝑦 =
−𝑟S𝑁±√𝑟S
2+8𝑟S
3/2
2
𝑁. Solve 
above equations, we have following necessary condition 𝑟S(3𝑟S − 4√𝑟S + 1) = 0. Solve this necessary 
condition, we have three candidate stationary points 𝑟S = 0, 1 or 
1
9
. Finally, we know that the platform’s 
optimal solution must satisfies one of the following points 
 𝑟S = 1 and 𝑟C
 𝑁 + 𝐹C
 = 𝑁. (A20) 
 𝑟S = 0 and 𝑟C
 𝑁 + 𝐹C
 = 0. (A21) 
 𝑟S =
1
9
 and 𝑟C
 𝑁 + 𝐹C
 =
2
9
𝑁. (A22) 
Put points (A20) and (A21) into the firm’s general profit function, the results are all zero. Thus, we 
know the only reasonable stationary point of platform’s optimization problem is point (A22). 
To get sufficient condition, we first figure out the hessian matrix 
 
∇2𝜋 = [
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑦2
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑦𝜕𝑟S
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑟S𝜕𝑦
𝜕2𝜋
𝜕𝑟S
2
] = [
−
2
√𝑟S𝑁
1
√𝑟S
−
𝑟S𝑁−2𝑦
2𝑟S
3/2
𝑁
2𝑦−𝑟S𝑁
2𝑟S
3/2
𝑁
+
1
√𝑟S
−
3𝑦(𝑦−𝑟S𝑁)
4𝑟S
5/2
𝑁
−
𝑦
𝑟S
3/2
]. 
 
Hence the stationary points are at 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑦
= 0 and 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑟S
= 0. This gives us the stationary point (𝑦, 𝑟S) =
(
2
9
𝑁,
1
9
), and hence its value at the only stationary point is 
 
[
−6
𝑁
15
2
15
2
−
27
2
𝑁
], 
 
Which is negative semidefinite (D1 =
−6
𝑁
, D2 =
99
4
) . In conslusion, (𝑦, 𝑟S) = (
2
9
𝑁,
1
9
)  is the only 
maximization solution. Furthermore, it can be easily verified that both 𝜂∗ and 𝜃∗ all in 0 and 1.      
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